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I. INTRODUCTION
Why do we care about what happens to our property after death? For
the most part, the answer has to do with the passions that we feel in life:
love for family and friends; love for the arts; love for education; love for
bettering humanity. We want the people we care about to have the
money they need after we are gone, and we want the causes or institu-
tions about which we are passionate to continue in existence. But these
are not the only reasons. We often fear that our property will be put to a
use of which we do not approve, or that it will be wasted, and we want to
ensure that does not happen. And, in many cases, we may want to dis-
pose of our property so as to leave a mark on this world, so that those
who come afterward will look back on our life and accomplishments and
respect us and the values for which we stood.
One way of making sure that our property is used as we want it to be
after death is by the creation of a trust. Until recently, noncharitable
trusts were generally limited in duration by the Rule Against Perpetuities
(the "Rule"), which imposed restrictions on settlors who wished to keep
their property in the family.' Within the past few years, however, many
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American states have abolished or drastically curtailed the Rule by legis-
lation.2 These statutes have given rise to a new American legal entity:
the perpetual dynasty trust, a trust that has the potential to last forever, or
for hundreds of years, but need not be limited to charitable purposes.3
The perpetual dynasty trust gives unprecedented freedom to the settlor,
who can now extend a dead hand far into the future. The movement to
abolish the Rule has met with controversy, but the trend seems unlikely
to reverse.4 Because anyone can establish a perpetual dynasty trust in
one of the states that have abolished the Rule, states that have not yet
abolished the Rule are tempted to do so to prevent a loss of trust business
to other states.5
In a recent article, James E. Krier and the late Jesse Dukeminier have
offered a tonic purporting to remedy alleged negative consequences of
perpetual dynasty trusts. Concluding that few settlors genuinely wish to
bind the hands of their descendants forever, Dukeminier and Krier pro-
pose that those states that have abolished the Rule also enact legislation
2. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1313-14.
3. The term "dynasty trust" is sometimes used interchangeably with "perpetual trust," but the
former can refer more generally to any trust "set up primarily to perpetuate the trust estate for as
long a period as possible." Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 547
(1964). I use the term "perpetual dynasty trust" to specify those trusts that are both perpetual and
noncharitable and would not be permissible under the common law Rule.
4. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1343 (arguing that, in the likely event that the genera-
tion-skipping-tax exemption is raised, "more states can be expected to provide for perpetual trusts").
5. "Respectable authority suggests that the validity of a trust should be determined by the law
of the situs of trust property, not the law of the trust settlor's domicile." Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Pro-
tection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1035, 1082 (2000). Under
the Restatement view, a trust will be valid if it is valid under the laws of the state "with which, as to
the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant relationship." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS § 270 (1971). When the settlor manifests an intention that the trust be administered in a
particular state, the laws of that state may determine the trust's validity. See id. § 270 cmt. c ("Of
the states having relationships with the trust, much the most important insofar as the validity of the
trust is concerned is the state, if any, where the settlor manifested an intention that the trust be ad-
ministered."). Certain U.S. states, especially Alaska and Delaware, have begun to compete aggres-
sively for trust business from other states by allowing settlors to shield their assets from creditors.
Sterk, supra, at 1037. The theory is that, even though such trusts are not permitted in other states,
the law of the state of trust administration will be applied. Some of the states that have abolished the
Rule have likewise done so with the hope that other states will apply the law of the state of trust ad-
ministration in deciding the validity of a perpetual trust. It is not clear, however, whether this strat-
egy will be successful in the long run. The courts of the state where the settlor was domiciled at the
creation of the trust may conclude that that state, and not the state of trust administration, has the
"most significant relationship" with the trust, or that perpetuities violate a strong public policy of the
domicile state. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Reaching for the Sky--Or Pie in the Sky: Is U.S. On-
shore Trust Reform an Illusion?, 4 TRUSTS E ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 340, 344-45 (2003). The ques-
tion may ultimately turn on "whether the local court will be able to exercise jurisdiction over the out-
of-state trust or the foreign trustee," which depends on whether the trustee has had "minimum con-
tacts" with the domicile state. Id. at 346. Until these issues are resolved, however, states that abol-
ish the Rule may hope to see an increase in trust business, which means that the movement to abol-
ish the Rule is unlikely to reverse in the near future.
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enabling perpetual dynasty trusts to be easily undone after the beneficiar-
ies known to the settlor have died. Dukeminier and Krier suggest that
states that abolish the Rule also enact statutes that: (1) give the benefici-
aries the power, when all the beneficiaries who were known to the settlor
have died, to terminate or modify the trust without court approval (pro-
vided that they do not exercise the power in favor of themselves, their
creditors, or their estates); (2) give the beneficiaries a power, limited by a
statutory standard, to withdraw principal for their own benefit; (3) allow
the trustee to terminate the trust at will; and (4) give the beneficiaries an
unlimited power to replace a trustee without court approval.6 In the view
of Dukeminier and Krier, these statutes could alleviate the "difficulties of
duration" that perpetual dynasty trusts may engender. Although Duke-
minier and Krier discuss these proposed statutes in their article under the
heading "Default Rules," 7 the rules would in fact be mandatory and ap-
plicable to all trusts.8
The attitude of Dukeminier and Krier toward perpetual dynasty trusts
may reflect the prevailing sentiment among American property scholars,
many of whom are hostile to the abolition of the Rule.9 Moreover,
Dukeminier and Krier are not alone in suggesting that more flexible
modification and termination rules might be warranted in light of the
Rule's abolition. 10 The specific proposals made by Dukeminier and
6. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1338-39, 1341-42. Dukeminier and Krier also pro-
pose that courts be given a broad power to modify or terminate a trust if it would be to the advantage
of the then-income beneficiaries. Id. at 1340.
7. Id. at 1339.
8. Dukeminier and Krier assert that their proposed statutes "should govern when the trust in-
strument is inexpertly drafted." Id. at 1340. Dukeminier and Krier do not explain, however, how a
court is to determine whether a trust instrument is "inexpertly drafted," nor do they suggest any
mechanism whereby a settlor could prevent the rules from being applied. This leads one to conclude
that rules would in fact be mandatory and applicable to all trusts, a conclusion that was confirmed by
Krier in e-mail correspondence with the author of this Article. See E-mail from James E. Krier, Earl
Warren Delano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, to Joshua C. Tate, Samuel I.
Golieb Fellow, New York University School of Law (May 12, 2004) (on file with author).
9. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No
Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 603 n.4 (2000). But see T.P. Gallanis, The
Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission s Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284,
286-92 (2000) (rejecting certain philosophical arguments often made in support of the Rule and con-
cluding that the Rule must be evaluated according to its economic consequences). In general, law
professors tend to regard issues of dead-hand control as important. Cf Wayne M. Gazur, Do They
Practice What We Teach? A Survey of Practitioners and Estate Planning Professors, 19 VA. TAX
REV. 1, 46 (1999) (surveying views of law professors and estate planners on the importance of gen-
eration-skipping trusts).
10. E.g., Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uni-
form Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 721-22 (2001);
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: RIP. for the
R.A.P., 24 CARmOzo L. REV. 2097, 2118 (2003) ("[L]egislatures (or courts) could alter rules affect-
ing trust modification and termination to make it easier for trust beneficiaries to terminate trusts.").
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Krier, however, are quite revolutionary. Dukeminier and Krier would
limit the reach of the dead hand, but not in the same way as the, tradi-
tional Rule: They would effectively leave the duration of the trust up to
the beneficiaries. This is not the same as voiding interests automatically
based on when they will vest, and thus the Dukeminier and Krier propos-
als differ in effect from the old Rule.
This Article seeks to offer state legislatures full disclosure as to what
the proposals of Dukeminier and Krier really mean. The proposed stat-
utes would not enable the settlor to do anything that cannot be accom-
plished under existing law, but would give considerable power to the
beneficiaries to ignore or repudiate the settlor's wishes. Dukeminier and
Krier would put the beneficiaries in the driver's seat, allowing the bene-
ficiaries to decide, without court supervision, who should be the trustee
and whether (and on what terms) the trust should continue beyond the
traditional perpetuities period. No U.S. jurisdiction currently gives such
power to the beneficiaries. Dukeminier and Krier are proposing a sea
change in the American law of trusts.
This Article is a response to the proposals of Dukeminier and Krier
and does not pretend to advance a new theory on the policy ramifications
of perpetual dynasty trusts. Neither does the Article aim to decide
whether courts should in general give less weight to the settlor's intent, a
question that merits thorough and independent consideration.1 It is not
necessary to conclude that the settlor's intent should invariably be re-
spected in order to find fault with the Dukeminier and Krier proposals. If
perpetual dynasty trusts are harmful to society, as some might argue,
then states should simply retain some version of the Rule: The Duke-
minier and Krier statutes would allow perpetual dynasty trusts to con-
tinue as long as the beneficiaries are content with them. On the other
hand, states that intend to give unlimited freedom to the settlor should
not adopt the statutes proposed by Dukeminier and Krier, because the
statutes, without modification, would give too much power to the benefi-
ciaries to thwart the settlor's goals. The statutes envisioned by
Neither Chester nor Sterk proposes legislation as specific as that suggested by Dukeminier and
Krier.
11. Jeffrey Sherman has argued that a settlor should not be allowed to impose conditions on
access to trust funds that are designed to control the behavior of the beneficiaries. Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal
and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273. This Article will show that imposing such condi-
tions appears to be a goal of many settlors. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. Whether
it is wise to allow settlors to extend a dead hand in this way does not depend on whether states have
abolished the Rule.
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Dukeminier and Krier would give unprecedented control to the benefici-
aries without solving all the problems that a perpetual dynasty trust
might create.
Part II of this Article presents a brief summary of the history of the
Rule and of the current movement to abolish it. Part III summarizes the
argument and legislative proposals of Dukeminier and Krier. Reviewing
some of the many websites and articles written and created by estate
planners urging clients to set up trusts that last as long as the relevant ju-
risdiction permits, Part IV then considers the reasons that settlors may
have for creating perpetual dynasty trusts. While the primary theme of
these websites is that trusts that last more than one generation obtain tax
advantages, the websites suggest other reasons why the settlor might find
a perpetual or near-perpetual dynasty trust attractive. In light of these
other possible motivations for creating perpetual dynasty trusts, Part V
argues that the statutes proposed by Dukeminier and Krier would prevent
some settlors from achieving their goals, and briefly discusses the policy
implications of allowing the beneficiaries to override the settlor's intent.
Part VI concludes.
II. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND ITS ABOLITION
A. The Traditional Rule, "Wait-and-See, "and the USRAP
Across the centuries, the common law swung back and forth like a
pendulum between allowing and restricting property interests of unlim-
ited duration,1 2 but it eventually came to rest with the doctrine we know
as the Rule Against Perpetuities.13 For present purposes, it will suffice to
12. In 1285, the English statute De Donis imposed restrictions on the ability of a donee in fee
tail to alienate the land, and the royal justices gradually extended the restraint to subsequent genera-
tions, allowing for the creation of perpetual entails. JOSEPH BIANCALANA, THE FEE TAIL & THE
COMMON RECOVERY IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1176-1502, 106-21 (2001). Shortly after the justices
began to recognize perpetual entails, however, lawyers devised a fiction called the common recovery
by which a tenant in tail could bar, or break, the entail and sell the land to a third party. Id. at 121,
250-51. But lawyers eventually found a way around the common recovery, and invented "strict set-
tlements," in which a life estate was given to a prospective groom with a remainder to trustees dur-
ing his life and then successive remainders to his unborn sons. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 293-94 (4th ed. 2002); LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS,
1601-1740: THE ADOPTION OF THE STRICT SETTLEMENT 55-56 (1983). By the technique of reset-
tling the land in each generation, conveyancers were able to keep land in the groom's family in per-
petuity. BAKER, supra, at 294. This is the background to the development of the Rule.
13. The creation of the Rule is traditionally associated with The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22
Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), but one scholar has argued that it was not originally a rule "against" per-
petuities but a rule "of' perpetuities. See George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead
Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 21-22
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state Gray's classic formulation: "No interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being.at the
creation of the interest." 14 The Rule invalidates interests that may vest
too remotely in the future, 15 and its effect is to impose a time limit on the
ability of a person to make plans about the future ownership of his or her
property.
The classical Rule paid no attention to whether a particular interest
did, in fact, vest within the permissible period, and thus became a "trap
to the draftsman." 16 In applying the Rule, courts assumed that an eighty-
year-old woman might still have more children (the "fertile octo-
generian" assumption) and that a middle-aged married man might take a
second wife who was not yet born at the time an instrument was created
(the "unborn widow" possibility). 17  Because strict application of the
Rule involved such counterfactual assumptions, a movement began in the
mid-twentieth century to amend the Rule so that courts would "wait and
see" whether a particular interest actually did vest within the prescribed
period.18 Pennsylvania enacted the first wait-and-see statute in 1947.19
This led to a series of debates among leading American property scholars
that have been dubbed the "Perpetuities Wars. 2°
The leading American proponent of the wait-and-see rule was W.
Barton Leach, who argued in a famous article that the Rule should take
into consideration what actually happened rather than what might con-
ceivably happen.21 Leach's suggestion met with considerable opposition,
most notably from Lewis M. Simes, who offered several objections to
the wait-and-see rule.22 By Leach's death in 1971, however, six states
had adopted the wait-and-see rule for the full perpetuities period, and six
(1977).
14. JOHN CHiPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).
15. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 639 (1938).
16. Id. at 643.
17. Id. at 643-44.
18. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1305-07.
19. Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The " Wait and See " Doctrine,
52 MICH. L. REv. 179, 183 (1953)
20. Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. REV.
323, 333 n.24 (1990).
21. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV.
L. REv. 721,747 (1952). Dukeminier supported Leach's view. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JR., PERPE-
TUITIES LAW IN ACTION: KENTUCKY CASE LAW OF THE 1960 REFORM ACT 70-75 (1962) (citing
cases that "offer rather convincing support ... for Professor Leach's recent attack on the remote pos-
sibilities test").
22. Simes, supra note 19, at 184-90.
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other states had adopted a limited version of wait-and-see. 23 In 1979, af-
ter much debate, the drafter of the Restatement of Property adopted the
wait-and-see rule,2 4 giving Leach a posthumous victory.
In order to apply the "wait-and-see" doctrine, it was necessary to an-
swer a difficult question: For whose lives were the courts to "wait and
see" if the interest vested within the permissible period? 25 The Restate-
ment offered a list of individuals who counted as measuring lives.
26
Dukeminier found this list unprincipled and arbitrary, and suggested that
courts should instead follow the procedure under the old Rule and look to
persons "causally connected to vesting. 27 Lawrence Waggoner doubted
whether the common-law approach to measuring lives could be applied
in the wait-and-see context, reasoning that the common law identified
"measuring lives" only for valid interests, and that such measuring
lives-which Waggoner termed "validating lives"-could not be used
for purposes of a wait-and-see rule.2 8 Waggoner proposed instead that
courts mark the wait-and-see period by a fixed time limit somewhere be-
tween eighty and 100 years. 29 The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Per-
petuities ("USRAP"), of which Waggoner was the principal architect, ul-
timately provided for a ninety-year time period.30  Many states
subsequently adopted the USRAP, 31 and the ninety-year wait-and-see pe-
23. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1306-07.
24. Id. at 1307; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATtvE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983).
25. Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1648
(1985).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIvE TRANSFERS § 63 (1983).
27. Dukeminier, supra note 25, at 1648, 1674-81.
28. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLuM. L. REV.
1714, 1714-15 (1985).
29. Id. at 1726-28. The debate continued in a series of rejoinders and rebuttals. See Jesse
Dukeminier, A Response by Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1730 (1985); Lawrence W.
Waggoner, A Rejoinder by Professor Waggoner, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (1985); Jesse Duke-
minier, A Final Comment by Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1742 (1985).
30. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale
of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 158-60 (1988).
31. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted the USRAP and have not yet
repealed it. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2901 to -2906 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 21200-231 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-11-1101 to -1107 (West 2004); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-490 to -496 (West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-901 to -907 (2004); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 689.225 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-6-200 to -206 (West 2004); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 525-1 to -6 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-17-8-1 to -6 (West 2004); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-3401 to -3408 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1-11 (West 2004);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.71 to .78 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501A.01 to .07
(West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-1001 to -1007 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2001
to -2008 (Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.103 to .1039 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-2-901 to -906 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 41-15 to -22 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 47-02-27.1 to .5 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.950 to .975 (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-6-10 to -80 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-1-201 to -208 (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN.
2005]
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riod became the dominant variation on the Rule in the late twentieth cen-
tury.
B. The GST Tax Exemption
USRAP was not the last word in perpetuities reform, but legal schol-
ars are no longer spearheading the reform movement. In order to under-
stand developments since USRAP, a brief discussion of federal estate
and gift taxation is necessary.
In 1916, Congress enacted a federal estate tax. 32 Taxpayers were ini-
tially able to avoid this tax by making lifetime gifts, but Congress se-
verely limited that possibility in 1924 by enacting a gift tax.33 However,
neither the gift tax nor the estate tax applied to the termination of a life
estate in a child; when a trust was used to transfer property first to one's
children for life and then to one's grandchildren, the first transfer was
subject to taxation but the second was not.34 Wealthy people took advan-
tage of this opportunity and created such generation-skipping trusts,
which could last as long as the relevant Rule permitted.35
Congress eventually decided to narrow the gap in the existing tax
law through a tax on generation-skipping transfers, which was enacted in
1976 and substantially reconfigured in 1986.36 In enacting the 1986
Generation-Skipping Transfer ("GST") Tax, however, Congress included
§§ 55-12.1 to .6 (Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-lA-1 to -8 (West 2004). Alaska, New
Jersey, and Utah adopted USRAP but subsequently repealed it. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050 (Mi-
chie 2004) (repealed 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-1 (West 2004) (repealed 1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-1201 to -1209 (West 2004) (replacing USRAP with a scheme allowing for thousand-
year dynasty trusts). Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, Nebraska, and Virginia have
amended their statutes to permit perpetual or near-perpetual trusts under certain circumstances. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901(A)(3) (West 2004) (exempting interests from invalidation where
"[t]he interest is under a trust whose trustee has the expressed or implied power to sell the trust as-
sets and at one or more times after the creation of the interest one or more persons who are living
when the trust is created have an unlimited power to terminate the interest"); D.C. CODE
§ 19-904(10) (2004) (exempting trusts where the trustee has the power of sale and the governing
instrument provides that the Rule does not apply); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225(2)(f) (West 2004)
(substituting 360 years for ninety years for trusts created after December 31, 2000); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 76-2005(9) (West 2004) (exempting trusts where the trustee has the power of sale and the
governing instrument provides that the Rule does not apply); VA. CODE ANN. §55-13.3(C) (West
2004) (specifying that the Rule does not apply to a trust "when the trust instrument, by its terms,
provides that the rule against perpetuities shall not apply to such trust").
32. 5 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES &
GIFTS 120.1, at 120-1 to -2 (2d ed. 1993).
33. Id 120.1, at 120-2.
34. Id. 120.2.3, at 120-11to-12.
35. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1312-13.
36. See BVITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 120.2.3, at 120-12 to -13.
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an exemption of $1 million for each transferor.3 7 This exemption has
been increased to $1.5 million for decedents dying in 2004, and will con-
tinue to increase in stages until it reaches $3.5 million in 2009.38 Ac-
cordingly, it is now possible to create a generation-skipping trust worth
up to $1.5 million that will not be subject to the GST tax.39 Unless and
until it runs afoul of the Rule, such a trust can continue to pass down in-
come or principal free of federal transfer taxes to an infinite number of
generations, assuming Congress does not in the future repeal, reduce, or
limit the GST exemption.
C. Abolition of the Rule
Before Congress enacted the GST tax, only two states, Idaho and
Wisconsin, had abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities, with the proviso
that restraints on alienation beyond the common-law perpetuities period
were not permitted.4 ° In 1983, after the original version of the GST tax
was enacted but before the substantial 1986 revisions, South Dakota be-
came the third state to abolish the Rule, again subject to a limitation on
restraints on alienation.41 At the time it abolished the Rule, South Da-
kota was engaged in "an aggressive campaign to attract trust and banking
[business] to the State. ' ' 2
Since South Dakota abolished the rule, legislatures in a number of
American states, hoping to attract trust business to their state,43 have
abolished or drastically limited the scope of the Rule. Such legislation
has been enacted in sixteen states, not counting the three that abolished it
before 1986, and the District of Columbia." Other states are considering
37. Id. 120.2.3, at 120-13.
38. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2010(c), 2631(c) (West 2004) (providing the credit amount against estate
tax and the inflation formula for the GST exemption).
39. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1313 (stating that the GST tax will be adjusted for
inflation to $1.5 million in 2004). If the trust is created inter vivos, however, the initial transfer will
be subject to gift tax to the extent it exceeds the $1 million gift tax exemption. Sterk, supra note 10,
at 2100-0 1.
40. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (Michie 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 2004); Sterk, supra
note 10, at 2101.
41. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-5-1, -8 (Michie 2004).
42. Sterk, supra note 10, at 2101-02.
43. Id. at 2103.
44. The statutes vary in their operation. Alaska and New Jersey have abolished the common
law Rule and replaced it with a restriction on the settlor's ability to suspend the power of alienation
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.100 (Michie 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2F-9, :2F-10 (West 2003).
Delaware has retained a version of the Rule, but only for interests of real property. See DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a)-(e) (Supp. 2004). Rhode Island has abolished the Rule outright. See R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (Supp. 2004). Virginia exempts a trust from the Rule when the governing
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proposals to abolish the Rule, and the list of states that allow the creation
of perpetual dynasty trusts is likely to grow.45
Because the movement to abolish the Rule is closely related to the
GST tax exemption,46 Congress has considerable power over the future
of the Rule.47 If Congress decides to abolish the estate tax completely by
2010, there will be no special transfer tax advantage in generation-
skipping trusts, relieving the pressure to abolish the Rule for those states
that have not already done so. 48 But a settlor from any state can establish
a perpetual dynasty trust in a jurisdiction that has abolished the Rule,49
and the list of states that have done so is already long. In any event, it is
doubtful whether Congress will really do away with the estate tax alto-
gether.
If Congress suddenly became strangely passionate about perpetuities,
it could take measures to make them less attractive, perhaps by amending
the GST exemption so that it would not apply to perpetual trusts, which
instrument specifies that the Rule does not apply. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(C) (Michie 2003).
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, and the District of Columbia do so as
well, provided that the trust gives the trustee a qualifying power of sale. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-904(10) (Supp. 2004); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 305/3(a-5), 305/4(a)(8) (West 2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101-A (West Supp. 2004); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 11-102(e) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2005(9) (Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT § 564:24(l.)
(Supp. 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.09(B)(1) (Anderson 2002). Missouri specifies that the
Rule does not apply whenever the trustee has a qualifying power of sale. MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 456.236(1) (West Supp. 2004). Arizona exempts trusts where the trustee has the power of sale and
"at one or more times after the creation of the interest one or more persons who are living when the
trust is created have an unlimited power to terminate the interest." See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 14-2901(A)(3) (West Supp. 2004). Utah and Wyoming have adopted a perpetuities period of
1,000 years. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1201 to -1209 (Supp. 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1-139 (West 2004) (stating that the 1,000-year period applies where the trust instrument states
that the Rule does not apply and where the trust will terminate no later than 1,000 years after its
creation). Florida has amended its USRAP to provide for a 360-year wait-and-see period. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 689.225(2)(f) (West Supp. 2004).
45. As of this writing, legislation is pending in Connecticut, New York, and Texas, and may be
reintroduced in Kentucky. See H.R. 6935, 2005 Gen. Assem. (Conn. 2005); A. 4924, 228th Annual
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H.R. 2561, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2005); E-mail from the Hon. Brent Yonts, Ken-
tucky State House Representative, to Joshua C. Tate, Samuel I. Golieb Fellow, New York University
School of Law (March 21, 2005) (on file with author). The Montana legislature has passed a joint
resolution authorizing the appointment of a committee to study the issue. H.R. Joint Res. 27, 59th
Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005).
46. As discussed below, however, tax benefits are far from the only motivation for creating
dynasty trusts. See infra Part IV. While the GST tax exemption has no doubt accelerated the aboli-
tion of the Rule, it is possible that the Rule would eventually have been eliminated even without the
exemption.
47. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1342-43.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 5 ("'Respectable authority suggests that the validity of a trust should be de-
termined by the law of the situs of trust property, not the law of the trust settlor's domicile."' (cita-
tion omitted)).
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would negate the incentive to repeal the Rule.5° Under the most likely
scenario, however, Congress will continue to increase the GST exemp-
tion, multiplying the tax advantages of perpetual dynasty trusts and in-
creasing the incentive for states to abolish the Rule.51 If the Rule contin-
ues to be abrogated, the question arises of what additional changes to the
law of trusts might be appropriate. In their recent article, Dukeminier
and Krier attempt to answer this question.
III. DUKEMINIER AND KRIER ON PERPETUAL TRUSTS
Dukeminier, who devoted much of his scholarly career to questions
of perpetuities reform, saw merit in the traditional common law approach
toward choosing measuring lives. 52 He was not pleased to see the Rule
abolished in state after state with little regard for a half-century's worth
of legal scholarship and debate on the subject.5 3 In his last article, com-
pleted by Krier after his death,54 Dukeminier tried to assess what settlors
really hoped to accomplish by means of perpetual dynasty trusts, sug-
gested some difficulties that might arise from such trusts, and made pro-
posals regarding how those difficulties could be remedied.55
Dukeminier and Krier identify three sorts of problems that might
arise from perpetual trusts, which they refer to as the problems of in-
alienability, first-generation monopoly, and duration.56  The first prob-
lem, inalienability, arises from the fact that, historically, perpetuities in-
terfered with the free alienability of property.57 Dukeminier and Krier
conclude that this problem has been largely solved, as the vast majority
of trusts give the trustee the power to sell the trust property and invest in
other assets, and almost all the states that have abolished the Rule give
this power to the trustees by statute if it is not included in the trust in-
strument.58
50. Dukenminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1343.
51. Id.
52. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
53. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1317 (referring to the "troubling likelihood that
the Rule against Perpetuities is being abolished with little if any reflection upon the merits of the
Rule on its own, without regard to tax considerations").
54. Id. at 1303 n.**.
55. Id. at 1303.
56. Id. at 1319.
57. Id. at 1319-20.
58. Id. at 1321. This argument may, however, continue to have persuasive force. A trustee can
be sued for making irresponsible investments, and is therefore likely to be a more conservative in-
vestor than an outright owner. Thus, tying up property in a perpetual trust may discourage risk, and
thereby have an effect on the market even if the trustee has the power to sell. Whether this effect is
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The second problem, first-generation monopoly, refers to the ability
of the settlor (the first generation) to make all the decisions regarding the
use of the trust property, leaving future generations no control over how
the property is used.59 Dukeminier and Krier devote somewhat more at-
tention to this problem, which implicates philosophical concerns about
fairness and equality of opportunity, but they do not find the philosophi-
cal and sociological arguments against perpetuities especially persuasive,
and do not suggest any ways to ameliorate these concerns.6 °
In the view of Dukeminier and Krier, the most serious objection to
the creation of perpetual trusts is what they call the problem of dura-
tion.61 This problem could be more aptly characterized as a problem of
inflexibility. Because the settlor cannot foresee the future, Dukeminier
and Krier explain, the settlor will not be able to anticipate changes in the
number, needs, and abilities of the trust's beneficiaries; in the tax law
and the law of trusts; in opportunities for investment; in the inflation rate
and the value of the dollar; and in the persons who serve as trustees and
the quality of their performance.62 Changes in circumstances may lead to
economic inefficiency or harm the beneficiaries.63 As a consequence,
Dukeminier and Krier want to make it easier to modify or terminate a
trust after circumstances have changed, and to replace the trustee if the
beneficiaries become dissatisfied with the trustee's fees or perform-
ance.64 Finally, Dukeminier and Krier are concerned about the possibil-
ity that multiplication of beneficiaries will eventually make the trust un-
manageable.
65
Under current law, it is difficult for a trust to be modified or termi-
nated after the settlor has died. In Claflin v. Claflin,66 a case decided in
the late nineteenth century, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that a trust, if otherwise legally valid and in accordance with public
policy, cannot be terminated early if doing so would contravene a mate-
rial purpose of the settlor.67 This rule, which came to be known as the
Claflin doctrine, was subsequently adopted in most American jurisdic-
negative or positive is beyond the scope of this Article.
59. Id. at 1321. This supposed problem could equally be termed "owner monopoly," since the
first generation is the owner of the property.
60. Id. at 1321-27.
61. Id. at 1327.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1335-37.
65. Id. at 1339.
66. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
67. Id. at 456.
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tions. 68 The Claflin rule is also applied to modifications of a trust. A
court may direct a trustee to deviate from the trust's terms when "owing
to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him
compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment Of
the purposes of the trust," but not "merely because such deviation would
be more advantageous to the beneficiaries., 69 Thus, for well over a cen-
tury, implementing the settlor's intent has been the dominant paradigm
of American trust law when questions of modification and termination
are concerned.
The trend of recent years has been to give beneficiaries and courts
more power to terminate or modify trusts, but the settlor's intent remains
a key factor. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides that, if all the
beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust agree, they can "compel the modifi-
cation or termination of the trust," providing that this would not be "in-
consistent with a material purpose of the trust., 70 A comment notes that
"[m]aterial purposes are not readily to be inferred" and that a "finding of
such a purpose generally requires some showing of a particular concern
or objective on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to a
beneficiary's management skills, judgment, or level of maturity." 71 A
similar provision is contained in the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"),72 and
both the UTC and the Third Restatement specify that a spendthrift clause
does not necessarily constitute a material purpose of the trust.73 The
Third Restatement, but not the UTC, allows a court to modify or termi-
nate a trust even when doing so would contravene a material purpose of
the settlor, provided that the court determines that the reasons advanced
by the beneficiaries in favor of modification or termination outweigh the
material purpose.74 Both the UTC and the Third Restatement also adopt
68. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (1985).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 & cmt. b (1959).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (2003). A comment explains that, while all benefi-
ciaries must consent, "[t]he consent of potential beneficiaries who cannot consent for themselves ...
may be provided by guardians ad litem, by court appointed or other legally authorized representa-
tives, or through representation by other beneficiaries under the doctrine of virtual representation."
Id. § 65 cmt. b.
71. Id§65cmt.d.
72. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b) (2004) [hereinafter UTC]. The California Probate Code has
also moved away from the strict Claflin doctrine and allows for easier modification of trust terms.
See Chester, supra note 10, at 701-06.
73. U.T.C., supra note 71, § 41 1(c); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. e (2003).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2). This provision is absent in the UTC, possibly
because it has little chance of being adopted by state legislatures, which are reluctant to thwart the
settlor's intent. The spirit of section 65(2) is embraced by Dukeminier and Krier, although they
would grant broader powers of modification and termination to courts. See infra text accompanying
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an expanded "equitable deviation" doctrine, allowing the court to modify
the dispositive provisions of a trust in order to further the settlor's pur-
poses when the settlor has failed to anticipate a change in circum-
stances. 7
The reforms of the UTC and the Third Restatement, if adopted, will
make it somewhat easier for the beneficiaries to compel the termination
or modification of a trust due to a change in circumstances. The idea is
that the settlor, if he or she were still living, would or should approve of
termination or modification when no material purpose of the trust is im-
paired or (in the case of the Third Restatement) the material purpose is
outweighed by the reasons in favor of termination.76 Thus, the UTC and
Third Restatement claim to further the settlor's purposes. 7
The UTC has also made it easier to remove a trustee. Under the tra-
ditional rule, it was difficult to remove a trustee except in cases of seri-
ous unfitness, commission of a crime, or breach of trust.78  The UTC
permits removal when the trustee is unwilling or persistently fails to ad-
minister the trust effectively, or when the beneficiaries all request re-
moval, provided that the court determines that removal serves the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries. 79  These provisions are mandatory law and
cannot be avoided through drafting of the trust instrument.80  The Third
Restatement also allows the court, in its discretion, to remove a "trustee
whose continuation in that role would be detrimental to the interests of
the beneficiaries., 81 The basic idea is that the settlor, were he or she still
living, would consent to removal of the trustee when removal serves the
beneficiaries' interests.82
note 89.
75. UTC, supra note 71, § 412; RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66.
76. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 621,
661-62 (2004). See also Chester, supra note 10, at 728 ("Flexibility in changed circumstances un-
doubtedly would appeal to many dead settlors if they could be brought back to life."); John H. Lang-
bein, The Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 TR. L.
INT'L 66, 69 (2001) (explaining that the reforms of the UTC are "[c]onsistent with the rationale of
the 'material purpose' doctrine, which is to defer to the interests and intention of the settlor").
77. Whether the reforms of the UTC and Third Restatement are in fact intent-implementing is
beyond the scope of this Article.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmt. b (1959) (listing as grounds for removal of
a trustee: "lack of capacity to administer the trust. .. ; the commission of a serious breach of trust;
refusal to give a bond, if a bond is required; refusal to account; the commission of a crime, particu-
larly one involving dishonesty; unfitness, whether due to old age, habitual drunkenness, want of abil-
ity or other cause; permanent or long-continued absence from the State; the showing of favoritism to
one or more beneficiaries; [and] unreasonable or corrupt failure to co-operate with his co-trustees").
79. UTC, supra note 71, § 706(b).
80. Id. § 105(b).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. d.
82. See Sitkoff, supra note 76, at 665 (noting that the more liberal removal standards of the
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While Dukeminier and Krier endorse the approach of the UTC and
the Third Restatement, they do not think these provisions go far enough
to prevent the anticipated problems of inflexibility associated with dy-
nasty trusts.83 Under the UTC and Third Restatement, modification and
termination of trusts and removal of trustees generally involve court par-
ticipation.84  Dukeminier and Krier are concerned that involving the
courts will be too costly for the beneficiaries.85 Dukeminier and Krier
acknowledge that any problems of inflexibility could be solved through
apt drafting, including special powers of appointment in beneficiaries,
discretionary powers in trustees, and provisions allowing beneficiaries to
replace the trustee.86 But Dukeminier and Krier are concerned that some
of the new perpetual trusts will be "inexpertly drafted," and propose that
statutes be enacted to give trustees and beneficiaries those powers that
would supposedly be included in a well-drafted trust.8 7
Dukeminier and Krier propose several legislative "alternatives" that
states could follow to resolve problems of inflexibility, four of which
they endorse.88 First, Dukeminier and Krier suggest that legislation
could give courts broad power to terminate a trust after the beneficiaries
who were alive at the trust's creation are dead, if termination would be to
the advantage of the then income beneficiaries. 89 Unlike the equivalent
provision in the Third Restatement,90 the statute envisioned by Duke-
minier and Krier does not require the court to balance the interest of the
beneficiaries against the material purposes of the settlor: the court need
not consider the settlor's intent. Second, Dukeminier and Krier suggest
"a statute giving the power of modification or termination to the income
beneficiaries in succession, but only after the income beneficiaries
known to the settlor die." 91 To avoid adverse tax consequences, Duke-
minier and Krier suggest that this be a special power that cannot be exer-
UTC can be justified in part by the fact that modem settlors regularly provide for easier substitution
of trustees).
83. Dukeminier & Krier,supra note 1, at 1330-31.
84. UTC, supra note 71, §§ 411(b), 706(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 37, 65.
While the Restatement allows, in principle, for a trust to be terminated without a court decree, "[a]s a
practical matter.., the trustee is under a duty to assure that all requirements of the rule are satisfied
before acting on a beneficiary plan for termination or modification." Id. § 65, cmt. a.
85. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1331, 1338.
86. Id. at 1339-40.
87. Id. at 1340-41.
88. Dukeminier and Krier suggest the possibility of a rule terminating trusts after a given pe-
riod, but then reject this option on the ground that termination might not always be in the beneficiar-
ies' interest. Id. at 1341.
89. Id. at 1340-41.
90. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2).
91. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1341.
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cised in favor of the holders of the power or their creditors or estates,92
but there would be nothing to prevent it being exercised in favor of the
beneficiaries' spouses or children. Dukeminier and Krier also propose
that each beneficiary have the power to withdraw principal for his or her
own benefit, "limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the benefi-
ciary's health, education, support, or maintenance. 93
Third, Dukeminier and Krier propose that the trustee be given a
statutory power to terminate the trust without a lawsuit.94  Finally,
Dukeminier and Krier propose that a statute "give the beneficiaries
power to remove or replace a trustee at will," which would give them
powerful leverage to ensure that the trustee does what the beneficiaries
want. 95 Dukeminier and Krier give no indication that these last two stat-
utes would apply only after the beneficiaries known to the settlor have
died. Dukeminier and Krier intend all these rules to be mandatory in na-
ture, meaning that the settlor could not avoid them through language in
the trust instrument.96
The statutes proposed by Dukeminier and Krier would make it im-
possible, as a practical matter, for a settlor to impose permanent, binding
conditions on the beneficiaries' access to trust funds.9 7 As Dukeminier
and Krier note, there are many reasons why a settlor might wish to im-
pose restrictions on access to trust funds: For example, the settlor might
fear that the beneficiaries could prove to be prone to making bad finan-
cial decisions, and might want to make those decisions in advance on the
beneficiaries' behalf.98 By the use of spendthrift clauses and other provi-
sions, estate planners can draft a trust so as to protect the beneficiaries
from misfortune and prevent the beneficiaries from squandering trust
funds.
In their analysis of the movement to abolish the Rule, Dukeminier
and Krier do not emphasize the protective possibilities of trusts. Instead,
Dukeminier and Krier state that the movement to abolish the Rule "has
little if anything to do with some wish on the part of wealthy people to
control the lives of their unknown descendants; rather, it has to do with
their interest in saving on federal transfer taxes imposed at the descen-
92. Id. This is designed to avoid triggering I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (1994). See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2041-1 (defining powers of appointment).
93. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1341.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1342.
96. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
97. See infra Part V.
98. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1322 (discussing the arguments of Thomas Gallanis).
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dants' deaths, and on competition among the states to cater to that inter-
est." 99 For this reason, Dukeminier and Krier conclude that "settlors
would rather hold to the beneficial purposes of their trust than to precise
terms that have come to be inconsistent with those purposes, given sub-
sequent events."' 00 In other words, Dukeminier and Krier contend that
their proposals would merely implement the settlor's presumed intent.
How states should evaluate the statutes proposed by Dukeminier and
Krier depends in part on what settlors are trying to accomplish with per-
petual dynasty trusts. A settlor who does not wish to control access to
trust funds by unborn descendants would not object to statutes giving
beneficiaries and courts the power to modify or terminate the trust after
all the beneficiaries known to the settlor have died. By the same token, a
settlor who wants only to pass tax savings down from one generation to
another might not mind if the trustee was given a statutory power to ter-
minate the trust, or if the beneficiaries had the power to replace the trus-
tee. 10 ' The proposals of Dukeminier and Krier would implement the in-
tent of such settlors.
On the other hand, the statutes proposed by Dukeminier and Krier
would defeat the intent of a settlor who does want to impose perpetual,
binding conditions on access to trust funds, conditions that will apply to
unborn beneficiaries as well as beneficiaries known to the settlor.
Dukeminier and Krier offer courts, trustees, and beneficiaries a powerful
statutory arsenal with which to wage war on that settlor's intent, if in-
deed such a person exists.
Thus, whether the Dukeminier and Krier reforms are intent-
implementing or intent-defeating depends on what goals settlors actually
have. To answer that question, we must look to empirical evidence.
IV. THE ONLINE PROMOTION OF DYNASTY TRUSTS
The creation of a family trust is a private matter, and few settlors
make public their needs and intentions when executing a trust. Lawyers
and accountants, on the other hand, are very forthcoming about the bene-
fits a dynasty trust can offer. Because it is now possible to solicit clients
99. Id. at 1314-15.
100. Id. at 1328-29.
101. Even a settlor who is concerned solely with passing down tax benefits, however, might ob-
ject if the trustee had a statutory power to terminate the trust or if the beneficiaries had a statutory
power to replace the trustee. Such statutes could interfere with the settlor's desire to prevent his or




over the Internet, estate planners have created scores of websites and
written dozens of promotional articles encouraging wealthy individuals
to create dynasty trusts. The websites and articles are meant to introduce
the concept of a dynasty trust to wealthy individuals who either are un-
aware that such a tool exists or do not understand its purpose; the goal is
to attract more business by bringing in new clients or informing existing
clients about the potential benefits of a dynasty trust. Persons interested
in creating a dynasty trust are generally urged to contact the firm, lawyer,
or accountant whose name appears on the website or article.
The websites and promotional articles that estate planners post on the
Internet are not direct evidence of the intentions of settlors. In many
cases, an estate planner may be advertising benefits of which a typical
client would otherwise be ignorant. For example, many people may be
unaware that a dynasty trust can be drafted using a spendthrift clause to
protect the trust assets from creditors of the beneficiaries.' 0 2 Simply be-
cause a typical client would not be aware of a particular advantage of
dynasty trusts, however, does not mean that he or she does not find that
advantage attractive once its purpose is explained. Lawyers and ac-
countants would not tout a particular advantage of dynasty trusts if they
had no reason to think it would appeal to prospective clients,10 3 and it is
likely that each advantage mentioned in the websites speaks to the fears
and desires of at least a few settlors.
It is the rare settlor who would establish a perpetual dynasty trust
worth $1 million or more without first consulting with an estate planner
and learning what can be accomplished with such a trust. Thus, while
the websites do not tell us what uses people might find for dynasty trusts
in a hypothetical world without lawyers, they do give some indication as
to what a settlor might want when he or she, having listened to the advice
of an attorney, signs the trust instrument. That is the relevant question
for purposes of divining the settlor's intent. The websites and articles
therefore provide some empirical evidence, albeit derivative, as to what a
settlor might expect to gain by a perpetual dynasty trust.
10 4
102. However, given the explosion of interest in self-settled spendthrift trusts, see Sterk, supra
note 5, at 1037, it is possible that a substantial number of settlors are in fact aware of the possibilities
of spendthrift clauses before they contemplate setting up a perpetual dynasty trust.
103. On the other hand, the amount of attention that lawyers devote to particular advantages may
not reflect their importance to the settlor. The purpose of the websites is to show why the assistance
of an estate planner is necessary, and the more complicated a particular benefit sounds, the more the
client arguably needs the advice of a lawyer. This does not mean, however, that estate planners are
promoting benefits that would be of no interest to their clients; that would be a wholly unprofitable
exercise.
104. The websites discussed here may not represent the full spectrum of the estate planning bar.
It may be that only a small fraction of estate planning attorneys aggressively solicit business via the
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A. Reasons for Establishing Multigenerational Trusts
10 5
Dukeminier and Krier emphasize that the primary motivation for set-
ting up dynasty trusts is the possibility of passing tax savings down from
one generation to the next. 106 Virtually every website or article promot-
ing dynasty trusts gives prominent attention to the tax benefits they offer,
often mentioning them in the first sentence. 10 7  But this is far from the
only advantage to dynasty trusts mentioned by the estate planners.
One advantage of dynasty trusts that is heavily promoted in the web-
sites is the ability to protect family wealth from beneficiaries' bad judg-
ment or misfortune. Prospective settlors are frequently advised that they
Internet, and that the sample of websites discussed here may be skewed toward one end (the less
elite end) of the estate planning spectrum. I found these websites by running simple searches for
"dynasty trusts" and similar phrases on the Google search engine.
105. In this section I consider websites from all jurisdictions regardless of whether they have
abolished the Rule. Some of the "dynasty trusts" mentioned in these websites are not in fact perpet-
ual trusts, but the websites still shed light on why settlors, in general, want to establish multigenera-
tional trusts.
106. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1314-15.
107. See, e.g., Mark Albertson, Dynasty Trusts, at http://www.albertsonlaw.com/news.asp?
action=detail&article=65&category- (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) ("using the proper planning, your
family can save a check to the IRS every other generation and multiply family wealth at the same
time."); Gottlieb & Gottlieb, Dynasty Trust, at http://www.gottlieblaw.com/showdoc.php?docid
= 3
(last visited Jan. 24, 2005) ("when considering how best to pass on future generations, there is one
exemption in the transfer tax law that merits close attention."); James M. Griesser & Dennis Suck-
storf, There's More to Learn About Dynasty Trusts, at http://www.bizmonthly.com/10_2000/
page 1 1.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005) ("with a dynasty trust, a generation skipping transfer trust,
estate tax savings can be enormous."); Joel A. Mendler, Dynasty Trusts, at http://www.
baldwinhaspel.com/publications-33.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005) ("one of the most distressing
facts about death taxes for wealthy clients is that each time property passes from one generation to
the next, the IRS collects over 45% in death taxes."); National Network of Estate Planning Attor-
neys, What is a "Dynasty Trust"?, at http://www.netplanning.com/consumer/cda/0,1
69 2 ,13 5 6 -
996,00.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005) ("a Dynasty Trust is a sophisticated estate planning tech-
nique that allows affluent persons to avoid multiple estate taxes on property passing to different gen-
erations of their descendants."); Pioneer Bank & Trust, Dynasty Trust, at http://www.
pioneerbankandtrust.com/dynastytrust.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2005) ("South Dakota allows the
use of Dynasty Trusts, which may continue over many generations, or forever, without the imposi-
tion of additional estate tax."); John J. Scroggin, Dynasty Trusts, at http://www.scrogginlaw.
com/pdf/advxtops/dyntrust.PDF (last visited Jan. 24, 2005) (directing the reader to "[take a look at
the generational confiscation of wealth which occurs"); Steven W. Tarta, Dynasty Trusts, at
http://primarylaw.com/primarylaw/content/articles/readarticle?read=1012 (last modified May 1,
2002) ("Dynasty Trusts are specialized irrevocable trusts designed to shelter assets from transfer
taxes over multiple generations, while at the same time allowing your heirs to enjoy the fruits of
those assets."); Missy Vaselaney, Dynasty Trusts: Too Good To Be Ignored, at https://www.
cpa2biz.com/News/Selected+Features/Dynasty+Trusts+Too+Good+to+Be+lgnored.htm (last modi-
fied June 2003) ("tremendous tax and non-tax benefits may be derived from Dynasty Trust Planning
(DTP)."); Wachovia, Dynasty Trusts: Securing Your Wealth for Generations, at http://www.
wachovia.com/wealth/page/printer/0,,31 37_63,00.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) ("estate taxes
are likely to be the most burdensome taxes your family will ever have to face.").
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can prevent the trust assets from going to creditors of the beneficiaries,10 8
or former spouses following a divorce. 09 The possibility of money being
108. See, e.g., Albertson, supra note 107 (noting that protection from creditors is particularly
important "where children or grandchildren are in high risk occupations, such as physicians, civil
engineers or entrepreneurs"); Scott Butera, Keeping the Family Dynasty Alive, at
http://www.hawaiibusiness.cc/hb72000/default.cfm?articleid=19 (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) ("exe-
cuted properly, a Dynasty Trust can forever exempt its assets and the appreciation on those assets
from ... judgment creditors."); Cleveland, Waters & Bass, P.A., Creating a "Family Bank" with an
Irrevocable "Dynasty" Trust and a Survivorship Life Insurance Policy, at http://www.cwbpa.
com/dynasty.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (describing the trust estate as "creditor-safe"); Carol H.
Gonnella & Clay D. Geittmann, Dynasty Trusts: Protecting Your Wealth for Generations, at
http://www.jhestatelaw.com/PDF/DTP.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (referring to wealth kept in a
dynasty trust as "creditor-protected"); Carol H. Gonnella & Clay D. Geittmann, Wyoming Dynasty
Trusts: The Multigenerational Family Bank, at http://jhestatelaw.com/PDF/WyDynastyTrusts.pdf
(last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (noting how a dynasty trust can protect "the assets of the trust against the
claims of a descendant beneficiary's creditors"); Griesser & Suckstorf, supra note 107 (explaining
how spendthrift clauses can "prevent creditors of a beneficiary from attacking trust assets for indebt-
edness"); J. Kenneth Harris, Planning Advantages of a Dynasty Trust, at http://www.kenharrislaw.
com/dynasty.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (stating that "creditors of the beneficiaries cannot
reach the trust assets, preserving them against the beneficiary's bad decisions"); Law Office of Wil-
liam Edy, Multigenerational Planning with Dynasty Trusts, at http://www.web.archive.org/
web/20090203213727/http://edy-law.lawoffice.com/dynasty.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (asking
rhetorically if the reader wants "the funds inherited by your children to be lost to their judgment
creditors if they get sued or have to file bankruptcy"); Eric Linger, The Savvy Investor, at
http://www.sherwoodinv.com/newsletter/Dynasty%20Trust.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (warning
that an outright gift leaves the heir's inheritance "subject to claims of creditors"); Merrill Lynch,
What is a Dynasty Trust?, at http://askmerrill.ml.comIPublish/marketingcenters/products/
epsO 15_DYNASTY TRUST/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (stating that trust can provide "a line of
defense against.., creditors"); Mallah, Furman & Co., P.A., What You Need to Know if You Reside
in More than One State, at http://mallahfurman.com/downloads/204086IEPamO3.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005) (noting creditor protection); Gayle Tejada Pate, Taking Advantage of the Tax Relief
Act: Estate Planning, at http://www.lajollaplayhouse.com/fanfare/tax.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2005) (same); Mark D. Perkins & Dean Zayed, Dynasty Trusts: Multi-Generational Planning, at
http://www.dcba.org/brief/aprissue/1999/art30499.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (noting that
wealth preserved in a dynasty trust is "creditor-protected"); SaveWealth, LLC, Dynasty Trusts, at
http://www.savewealth.com/planning/estate/dynasty/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (noting how spend-
thrift clauses can protect trust assets from creditors); Milton Berry Scott, Dynasty Trusts, at
http://www.mbscott.com/dynasty.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (same); Tarta, supra note 107 (not-
ing how the principal is "protected from attachment by creditors of your heirs"); John Terakedis, Jr.,
Taxpayers Repeal Estate Tax By Creating a Dynasty Trust, at http://www.bizjoumals.com/
columbus/stories/2001/01/22/focus3.html?Page=3 (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (noting the creditor-
protection advantages of spendthrift provisions); Mark S. Weissman, Dynasty Trust, at
http://www.wwlaw.com/dynasty.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) ("If [the beneficiary] is sued for
any reason, the assets in the Trust do not belong to [her], and cannot be seized by her creditors.");
Kirk Wilson, A Trust out of State is Worth Considering, at http://www.hatchparent.com/
h+p/hpnews/articlesiH&P-wilson62.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (stating that a long-term trust
"can keep assets out of the hands of the creditors").
109. See, e.g., Albertson, supra note 107 ("If assets are kept in the Dynasty Trust, a divorcing
spouse will have no ability to receive trust assets in a divorce action, thereby protecting your
heirs."); Butera, supra note 108 (noting protection from "divorce settlements"); Gonnella & Geitt-
mann, Dynasty Trusts: Protecting Your Wealth, supra note 108, at I (noting protection on divorce);
Gonnella & Geittmann, Wyoming Dynasty Trusts, supra note 108, at 6 (same); Griesser & Suckstorf,
supra note 107 (showing how a spendthrift clause can "prevent the divorcing spouse of a beneficiary
from laying claim to trust assets"); Harris, supra note 108 (noting the "high incidence of divorce
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depleted by lawsuits is often mentioned," 0 and one website mentions the
possibility of doctors getting the money if the beneficiary has no health
insurance."' The central theme is that these "eroding influences" can be
avoided through a properly drafted dynasty trust.
112
One website tells prospective clients that a trust that protects the
beneficiaries from their creditors "evidences greater love than giving an
outright gift."' 1 3 But it is not simply a question of love: the same website
warns of the ominous possibility that one's assets could end up in the
hands of someone else's grandchildren if a dynasty trust is not used."
14
Another benefit that is often mentioned is the ability to prevent impru-
dent spenders, or those who are not financially responsible, from wasting
their inheritance." 5  Professional asset management is cited as an
during the last 10 or more years" and highlighting protection offered by dynasty trusts); Law Office
of William Edy, supra note 108 (asking if the reader wants "the divorce court to award your child's
ex-spouse a portion or one-half of the funds your child inherits from you if your child's spouse files
for a divorce"); Linger, supra note 108, at I (referring to the possibility that the heirs could "lose all
or part of their inheritance" following a divorce); Mallah, Furman & Co., P.A., supra note 108, at 3
(discussing protection from ex-spouses); Merrill Lynch, supra note 108 (noting that trust can protect
beneficiaries in the event of divorce); Pate, supra note 108 (same); Pension Professionals of Florida,
The Incentive Dynasty Trust, at http://www.taxstrategy.com/ap-in-dynasty.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2005) ("With your legal counsel, [the] Trust can be written... to protect the assets from bad mar-
riages .... "); Save Wealth, supra note 108 (same); Scott, supra note 108 (same); Tarta, supra note
107 (same); Wealth Preservation Advisors, Inc., The Family Dynasty Trust, at http://www.
wealthadvisors.net/dynasty.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (same); Weissman, supra note 108 ("If
[the beneficiary] gets divorced, her husband cannot claim community property rights over the
Trust."); Wilson, supra note 108, at 1 (describing protection from "the avaricious spouses of chil-
dren, grandchildren, and their children").
110. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, supra note 108 ("A trust can establish a line of defense against...
lawsuits .... "); Tarta, supra note 107 (noting that creditor protection "can be particularly useful in
the event of a lawsuit"); Wealth Preservation Advisors, supra note 109 (noting that trust can pre-
serve property from lawsuits); Weissman, supra note 108 (noting protection if the beneficiary or her
spouse "is sued for any reason").
111. Law Office of William Edy, supra note 108.
112. Linger, supra note 108 ("By making a small change to your living trust, you can avoid
these eroding influences.").
113. Law Office of William Edy, supra note 108.
114. Id.
115. See Griesser & Suckstorf, supra note 107 ("For beneficiaries who are not as financially re-
sponsible, certain provisions restricting their access to trust income or principal can be incorporated
into the trust."); Mallah, Furman & Co., P.A., supra note 108 (explaining that a settlor "can also in-
clude 'spendthrift provisions' that restrict the discretionary use of trust assets by irresponsible or
dissolute beneficiaries, as determined by the trustee"); Merrill Lynch, supra note 108 (noting protec-
tion against "imprudent spenders"); SaveWealth, supra note 108 (offering protection when benefici-
aries are not financially responsible); Scott, supra note 108 (same); Wilson, supra note 108 (noting
that a dynasty trust can "keep members of younger generations from squandering their inheritance").
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advantage.1 16 One website emphasizes that a dynasty trust can be struc-
tured so that "the Senior Family Members keep their hands on the finan-
cial wheel."
'1 17
None of these concerns are related to the GST tax exemption, but in-
stead reflect broader fears about what will happen to one's money. As
one website puts it, dynasty trusts avoid the concern "that a 50 year old
son will leave the assets to his 26 year old fourth wife, that a grandchild
will use the money to drink, spend and have a good time (spending
$500,000 in six months), or that a daughter will convert her inheritance
to community property and lose half of it when her husband divorces
her."' 1 8 A dynasty trust can provide comfort that one's hard-earned for-
tune will not be squandered by one's descendants or end up in the hands
of strangers.
Another common concern of wealthy individuals is that their de-
scendants will, in the words of one website, become "lazy bums.'19
Settlors want their descendants to have what they need, but they also
want them to be productive and hardworking members of society, and
they do not want their inheritance to provide disincentives in this re-
gard.120 Articles and websites speak to this concern by emphasizing that
distributions of trust funds can be made conditional on college gradua-
tion, income level, employment, or other indicators of success, 12 1 and
116. Wilson, supra note 108.
117. Wealth Preservation Advisors, supra note 109.
118. Scott, supra note 108.
119. Ralph M. Engel & Al W. King III, The Dynasty Trust-The Ultimate Estate Planning Vehi-
cle, at http://www.sonnenschein.com/pubs/publications/Pub 07 31_2001025204PM.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2005).
120. See Gonnella & Geittmann, Wyoming Dynasty Trusts, supra note 108, at 6 (explaining that
the grantor can "leave desired guidance and instructions to the Trustee so that the descendant benefi-
ciaries receive supplemental income from the trust without there being any disincentives to earn their
own way" and "so that the descendant beneficiaries are encouraged to be productive and viable
members of their communities"); Al W. King III, Despite Pending War, Possible Estate Tax Repeal
or Reform and an Uncertain Economy, Should Estate Planning Be a Priority?, at
http://www.lockeygroup.com/comer.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2005) ("These people want to ensure
that their families inherit enough money to do something, but not enough so that they do nothing.");
U.S. Trust, Advanced Estate Planning Techniques, at http://web.archive.org/web/
20 040220055545/http://www.ustrust.com/ustrust/htm/individua/rrustsandEstates/advancedestatepI
anning.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (stating that "individuals with large estates ... often are
concerned that the promise of inherited wealth might erode their beneficiaries' desire to build their
own productive lives and careers").
121. See A.J. Cook, Dynasty Trust, at http://www.taxfables.com/Columns/Estate/Dynasty_
Trust.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005) (explaining that an amount "can be distributed on special oc-
casions such as graduating from college, entering the missionary field or becoming an artist"); Engel
& King, supra note 119 (noting that provisions may be included "that require that, for an adult de-
scendant to share in the income of the trust (except due to illness, etc.), he must first accomplish cer-
tain goals, such as graduating from college or obtaining full-time employment"); Northern Trust
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that the trust funds can be used to provide incentives for positive behav-
ior 122 or to promote family philosophies and values. 123 Some estate plan-
ners also explain that distributions can be limited to the actual needs of
the beneficiaries. 1
24
The overriding theme of these websites and articles is that a dynasty
trust can allow a person to make sure that his or her wishes are carried
out after death. 125  One article enjoins readers to "[p]lan carefully and
choose wisely, and your intentions will last forever.' ' 126 If the way estate
planners promote dynasty trusts gives any indication as to why settlors
find them attractive, then it is evident that they are being used for a vari-
ety of reasons that have nothing to do with taxation. Settlors may not
want to control the lives of their descendants in every respect, but they
certainly want to make sure that their money is put to good use. Thus,
while tax concerns are very important, there are many other reasons why
a settlor might want to set up a dynasty trust.
B. The Time Horizon of Settlors
The estate planners' websites also offer evidence as to the extent to
which a settlor might be concerned about individuals who are not yet
born at the time a trust is created. One indication that some settlors may
Corp., Personal Finance: Dynasty Trusts, at http://northerntrust.com/pns/jsp?xml=0402/
44669347_3748.xml (last visited Jan. 26, 2005) (stating that the trust can provide that "[d]escendants
must accomplish certain goals-such as college or a particular earned income level-before receiv-
ing benefits").
122. See Scroggin, supra note 107 (noting that a trust can provide "'Incentives' which Encour-
age Positive Behavior by Family Members"); Vaselaney, supra note 107 ("[Dynasty Trust Planning]
can be used as a 'carrot or a stick,' for the heirs. This can be accomplished by including provisions
that encourage such things as education, marriage or occupational success. (Example: The trust can
match a beneficiary's earnings.) The trust also can discourage certain actions, such as divorce, or
alcohol and/or drug use.").
123. See Al W. King III, How to Play the Current Downturn... and Plan for a Decade of
Evolving Estate-Tax Rules, at http://redbook.registeredrep.com/featuredstory/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2005) (stating that "most families want to maintain social and fiscal responsibility in their families
forever (i.e. allowing family values to pass down with their inheritance)"); Terakedis, supra note
108, at http://www.bizjoumals.com/columbus/stories/2001/0l/22/focus3.html?page=
2 (explaining
that generational planning typically includes "imparting family philosophies and values").
124. See Albertson, supra note 107 ("The Dynasty Trust can provide that only such income and
principal as the beneficiaries genuinely need will be distributed. If you have a desire to provide only
for certain needs, such as education, you have the ability to do so within the trust instrument.");
Scroggin, supra note 107 ("Unless truly destitute, NO FAMILY MEMBER CAN LIVE OFF THE
TRUST INCOME!").
125. Merrill Lynch, supra note 108 ("A trust can.., ensure that your wishes are carried out after
your death."); Wachovia, supra note 107 ("Each subsequent generation, while benefiting from [the
trust] assets, has restricted access to principal, ensuring that your wishes are met.").
126. Butera, supra note 108.
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be interested in their unborn descendants may be found in the frequent
references to great-grandchildren or the descendants of grandchildren.
27
Since most people do not live to see the births of all their great-
grandchildren, such references suggest that at least some people are
thinking about unknown as well as known descendants. While some of
these websites, especially those promoting dynasty trusts in jurisdictions
that have not yet abolished the Rule, use qualifying language suggesting
that it might be unusual to think of great-grandchildren,
28 most do not.' 29
Another indication of the likely time horizon of these trusts may be
found in the language that is used to refer to their possible duration.
Websites and articles note that dynasty trusts can last for "many,'
' 30
"unlimited,"' 131 "multiple,"' 32 or "several"' 133 generations; for 100,134
127. See, e.g., Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Cos., Generation Skipping Trusts, at
http://www.bbh.com/docs/Trusts/ClientHandoutGenerationSkippingTax.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2005) (grandchildren and "more remote descendants"); Engel & King, supra note 119 ("grandchil-
dren and their descendants"); Gonnella & Geittmann, Dynasty Trusts: Protecting Your Wealth, supra
note 108 (great-grandchildren); Mallah, Furman & Co., P.A, supra note 108 (generations beyond
great-grandchildren); Mendler, supra note 107 (grandchildren and future generations); Gregory T.
Peacock, Generation-Sharing: Tax Planning that Benefits the Entire Family, at
http://www.wardandsmith.com/Pages/pub/article.php?article=Tax-Planning-That-Benefits (last
visited Jan. 21, 2005) ("grandchildren [] and successive generations"); Perkins & Zayed, supra note
108 ("great-grandchildren and so on through the generations"); Rome Associates, The Dynasty Trust
as a Planning Tool, at http://www.romeassoc.com/html/resourcecenter/library/articles/
wealthmanagement/dynastytrust.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) (great-grandchildren);
SaveWealth, supra note 108 (great-grandchildren); Daniel A. Shapiro, Family Business Owners:
Skip the Tax with a Dynasty Trust, at http://www.retailemews.com/499/dberdon499.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 21, 2005) ("a great-grandchild, and beyond"); Tarta, supra note 107 (great-grandchildren);
Wachovia, supra note 106, at 107 (great-grandchildren); Wilson, supra note 108 ("grandchildren
and their children").
128. See Mendler, supra note 107 (promoting dynasty trusts in a state that has not abolished the
Rule and stating that "grandchildren, and even future generations" can benefit); Rome Associates,
supra note 127 ("grandchildren or perhaps even your great-grandchildren"); SaveWealth, supra note
108 (explaining that "even great-grandchildren" can benefit from a trust within the context of the
traditional Rule); Tarta, supra note 107 (noting that "perhaps even your great-grandchildren" can
benefit).
129. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Cos., supra note 127; Engel & King, supra note 119; Gon-
nella & Geittmann, Dynasty Trusts: Protecting Your Wealth, supra note 108; Mallah, Furman & Co.,
P.A., supra note 108 ("great-grandchildren and possibly generations beyond"); Peacock, supra note
127; Perkins & Zayed, supra note 108; Shapiro, supra note 127, Wachovia, supra note 107; Wilson,
supra note 108.
130. UMB Bank, Dynasty Trust, at http://www.umb.com/personal/trust/sddynasty.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 21, 2005).
131. Cook, supra note 120; Merrill Lynch, supra note 108.
132. First Am. Bank & Trust, Trust Services, at http://www.firstambanktrust.com/Trust/
Services.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
133. Sec. Nat'l Bank, Trust Services, at http://www.snbonline.con/invest/trust.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2005).
134. Griesser & Suckstorf, supra note 107; SaveWealth, supra note 108.
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120,135 360,136 or 1,000 years to come; 137 or "forever."' 138  One website
tells readers, "Your heirs, for unlimited generations to come, will be
grateful to you, their great, great ad infinitum, grandparent."' 139  More
pointedly, an attorney in California advises in one article that "there are
situations where it would be nice to have a trust last longer" than ninety
to one-hundred years, and therefore California residents should consider
setting up an out-of-state dynasty trust.
140
There are other signs that some settlors may have truly dynastic in-
tentions. Several articles and websites make reference to the great indus-
trial dynasties of the early twentieth century, such as the Camegies,
Rockefellers, and Fords, 141 apparently with the implication that the
settlor of a dynasty trust can help make sure his or her family name is
similarly honored. Some websites challenge the reader to "build" or
"create" his or her "own dynasty."' 42  One website asks, "How regal-
and rewarding-can a dynasty trust be?" 143  These statements seem de-
signed to appeal to prospective customers who are interested in the long-
term continuity of their family "dynasty."
On balance, the evidence of the articles and websites suggests that at
least some settlors may be interested in the fact that a perpetual trust can
last forever and take care of their unborn descendants. These settlors
135. Cleveland, Waters & Bass, supra note 108.
136. Law Office of William Edy, supra note 108.
137. Gonnella & Geittmann, Wyoming Dynasty Trusts, supra note 108.
138. Engel & King, supra note 119; First Am. Bank & Trust, supra note 132; UMB Bank, supra
note 130.
139. Cook, supra note 120.
140. Wilson, supra note 107.
141. See Cleveland, Waters & Bass, supra note 107 (explaining that the dynasty trust "takes its
name from the trusts historically established by wealthy families (such as the Carnegies and Rocke-
fellers) to preserve and protect their 'dynastic' wealth for the support, use and benefit of succeeding
generations of the family"); Engel & King, supra note 119 (referring to "the trusts created by the
well-known industrialists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries"); Manulife Financial, Dynasty
Trust, at http://www.victorson.con/life/Estate Planning/Dynasty/o20Trust/o20ConPro%2 01018.pdf
(last visited Jan. 25, 2005) ("People often think of the Rockefellers or the Kennedy family when they
think of family dynasties."); Robert T. Napier & Assocs., Return of the Dynasty Trust, at
http://www.napier.com/winter98nwltr.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) ("It's not exactly the same
trust that the Rockefellers and Carnegies had earlier in the century, but a form of dynasty trust is
back."); SaveWealth, supra note 108 (referring to Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie as "visionaries"
because they created dynasty trusts to preserve their estates); Wealth Preservation Advisors, supra
note 109 (quoting Rockefeller on the importance of control).
142. Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Family Money: You Can Create Own Dynasty with Multigen-
erational Trust, at http://www.bovelaw.com/archive/Article%20You%20can%20create%
2 0 own%
20dynasty/o20with%20multigenerational%20trust.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2005); Mallah, Furman
& Co., P.A., supra note 108; Wyoming Banker's Ass'n, Build Your Dynasty in Wyoming, at
http://www.wyomingbankers.com/pdfs/BrochureDraft4.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
143. Cook, supra note 120.
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may well be a minority, but they are an important minority, insofar as
they would be likely to shop for a jurisdiction that permits the creation of
perpetual trusts, as suggested by one California attorney. 144 It is not safe
to assume that the typical settlor does not care what happens to his or her
money after all the beneficiaries who were living at the time the trust was
created have died: in fact, if settlors cared only about their known de-
scendants, there would be no need to abolish the Rule.
V. REFORM LEGISLATION AND THE SETTLOR'S INTENT
A. Impact of the Dukeminier and Krier Proposals
The websites and articles discussed above offer a glimpse at what
many settlors may be looking for when they set up dynasty trusts. While
most settlors certainly want to pass tax savings down to their descen-
dants, that is not the only apparent goal: settlors also wish to protect their
wealth from being wasted and to encourage their descendants to be pro-
ductive members of society. Moreover, although it may be true that most
settlors do not care about their unborn descendants, some of them might,
and those who do probably want their spendthrift provisions and restric-
tions on the use of funds to continue indefinitely.
As discussed above, 145 Dukeminier and Krier want states to give
courts broad power to terminate a trust after the beneficiaries who were
alive at the trust's creation are dead, if termination would be to the ad-
vantage of the then income beneficiaries. 146 Dukeminier and Krier fur-
ther suggest that states enact statutes giving each income beneficiary a
special power of modification or termination after the income beneficiar-
ies known to the settlor die. 147 Dukeminier and Krier also suggest that
each beneficiary have a limited power to withdraw principal from the
trust. 148 Finally, Dukeminier and Krier propose that the trustee be given
a statutory power to terminate the trust without a lawsuit, and that the
beneficiaries have the power to replace the trustee at will. 149 The rules
would be mandatory in nature and applicable to all trusts. 150
To the extent that, as the websites suggest, some settlors do want to
144. Wilson, supra note 108.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
146. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1340.
147. Id. at 1341.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 8.
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control the way their unborn descendants use trust funds, these proposals
will have the effect of frustrating this goal. If the trustee is too zealous
about enforcing the conditions imposed by the settlor, the beneficiaries
can substitute a more sympathetic trustee. Beneficiaries will be able to
shop for a trustee who is willing to do whatever the beneficiaries want
and who will overlook the express intentions of the settlor. The benefi-
ciaries will also be able to withdraw principal according to a standard
fixed by statute and applied by the courts, rather than according to the
settlor's wishes. Moreover, after all the beneficiaries known to the
settlor have died, the beneficiaries would be able to terminate the trust or
modify its terms and distribute the principal to anyone they please, as
long as they do not keep too much of it for themselves. This means that
the beneficiaries could give the money outright to their spouses or chil-
dren, or even to their friends, who could spend it on whatever they
wanted without regard to the intentions of the settlor. If the settlor im-
posed conditions on access to trust funds, such as that distributions be
conditional on graduation from college or income level, the beneficiaries
could modify the trust so that the conditions would not apply to subse-
quent generations. If some of the beneficiaries did not want to modify or
terminate the trust, those who did could turn to the courts, which would
have unlimited power to do so.
As Dukeminier and Krier acknowledge, their proposals would not al-
low the settlor to solve any problems that could not be dealt with by lan-
guage in the trust document. 151 Any competent estate planner could draft
a trust that allows for the flexibility that would be required by the Duke-
minier and Krier statutes. A settlor who receives competent legal advice
and knows what he or she wants to accomplish with a trust would not
benefit from the proposed rules. On the other hand, because the rules
would be mandatory, they would have the effect of frustrating the intent
of any settlor who truly wanted to control the use of the trust funds in
perpetuity. As applied to such a settlor, the proposed rules would be in-
tent-defeating.
One approach that state legislatures might wish to consider would be
to adopt some of the Dukeminier and Krier proposals but make them de-
fault rules rather than mandatory rules, allowing the settlor to specify in
the trust instrument that the rules do not apply. This possibility is sug-
gested by the heading under which Dukeminier and Krier present their
proposals, 152 but Dukeminier and Krier do not develop the idea.'53 Creat-
151. Id.at1339-40.
152. Id. at 1339 (entitled "Default Rules").
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ing default rules would avoid hindering the settlor who has made a con-
scious decision not to allow the beneficiaries or the trustee to modify or
terminate the trust, while protecting the ill-advised settlor who fails to
include modification or termination provisions out of ignorance. Duke-
minier and Krier do not intimate that the powers that the proposed stat-
utes would grant to beneficiaries, trustees, and courts could be limited by
the terms of a particular trust.
B. Policy Considerations
The proposals of Dukeminier and Krier raise difficult and troubling
policy questions. Whether the settlor's intent should be respected is a
central problem, perhaps the central problem, of the law of trusts. This
Section does not attempt to resolve the issue-probably an impossible
task-but merely to note that there are valid arguments that can be made
in defense of respecting the settlor's wishes and that the proposals of
Dukeminier and Krier are far from a panacea in any event.
Dukeminier and Krier argue that the inflexibility of perpetual dy-
nasty trusts could lead to "economic waste."' 54 This point is developed
more fully by Stewart Sterk, who argues that "the supposed efficiency
gains of the trust form become more speculative" when trusts are al-
lowed to continue indefinitely. 155 Sterk expresses his argument in terms
of agency costs. Because of potential liability for imprudent invest-
ments, the trustee is likely to invest more conservatively than the benefi-
ciaries would.' 56 The trustee also has an incentive to keep property in
trust even when doing so does not serve the beneficiaries' best interests,
so that the trustee can continue to collect fees for managing the trust.'
57
While the settlor is likely to take these agency costs into account when
planning a short-term trust, perpetual trusts offer significant tax advan-
tages that the settlor may decide outweigh the agency costs. 58 These tax
advantages, Sterk concludes, might lead settlors to create trusts that are
economically inefficient. 59
153. Nor is the idea fully explored here.
154. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1327.
155. Sterk, supra note 10, at 2114.
156. Id. at 2112.
157. Id. at 2111-12.
158. Id. at 2113.
159. Id. at 2114. Sterk also calls attention to the negative externalities created by spendthrift
provisions. Id. at 2114-17. These problems, however, are not limited to dynasty trusts and would
best be solved by legislation limiting the use of spendthrift clauses.
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It is true that each generation of beneficiaries has better information
than the settlor about the needs and propensities of that generation and
those that immediately follow. Allowing for easy modification and ter-
mination of trusts, it might be argued, gives the beneficiaries the power
to act on their superior information and decide whether the benefits of
trust management continue to outweigh the associated agency costs.
What this analysis ignores, however, is that a decision to modify or ter-
minate a trust also may involve value judgments, such as whether educa-
tion is more important than other accomplishments or whether inherited
wealth should be distributed in such a way as to encourage hard work.
As discussed above, some settlors may wish to make distributions condi-
tional on college graduation, employment, income level, or other indica-
tors of success. 160 After three or four generations, the beneficiaries may
no longer value hard work or education as much as the settlor. Manda-
tory rules providing for easy modification and termination allow the
beneficiaries, at each generation, to substitute their own values for those
of the settlor. It is not self-evident that the law should favor the values of
fourth- or fifth-generation beneficiaries over those of the settlor, whose
labor may have made the trust possible.
Another objection that is sometimes made against perpetuities is that
they interfere with equality of opportunity and promote the creation of a
leisure class. The law generally does not forbid individuals from making
unwise decisions about how their money is to be spent. When a transac-
tion has an adverse effect on society, however, the law will sometimes
intervene.1 61 It has been argued that dynasty trusts perpetuate the con-
centration of wealth among a select few and make it more difficult for
those who have no trust income to compete in the economic market-
place. 162 Over time, this could conceivably lead to a caste of people who
live off trust income and do not contribute anything of value to soci-
ety. 163 Dukeminier and Krier find this argument unpersuasive given that
income from capital represents only a small fraction of total income in
160. See supra note 121.
161. For example, laws against prostitution and the sale of "dangerous" drugs can be justified on
this basis. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 173-76, 266-68 (5th ed. 1998).
162. Angela M. Vallario, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS.
141, 155-56 (1999).
163. The argument that perpetuities can lead to the creation of an unproductive elite class has a
long history in the United States, dating back at least to the late eighteenth century. See Stanley N.
Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 14-18 (1977) (discussing the views of Thomas Jefferson). Early American republican legal
writers associated entailments of land, along with primogeniture, with English land-based social hi-
erarchy, which they considered "feudal" and incompatible with a republic. GREGORY S. ALEXAN-
DER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 39-40 (1997).
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the United States; educational opportunities are available to most chil-
dren at low cost; and human capital, rather than monetary capital, consti-
tutes the greatest source of inequality of opportunity.' 64 Nevertheless,
the argument is not without persuasive force in light of the fact that dy-
nasty trusts can grow to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars over the
course of a century.'
1 65
In response to the claim that perpetuities are detrimental to society,
some would argue that allowing each individual to direct how his or her
property will be used after death encourages work and savings, thereby
maximizing total wealth.1 66 Even if the marginal incentives for potential
settlors are insignificant, however, the Dukeminier and Krier proposals
are a partial solution to the problem at best. Under the statutes proposed
by Dukeminier and Krier, perpetual dynasty trusts will be modified or
terminated only when the trustee or the beneficiaries object. The trus-
tee's power to terminate is limited by the fact that the beneficiaries can
replace or remove the trustee. This means that, so long as the beneficiar-
ies are happy with the trust, it will last forever. If perpetual dynasty
trusts promote the creation of a leisure class, why should the beneficiar-
ies, whose growing wealth is the source of the problem, have the sole
power to decide whether to terminate the trust?
A better solution to the potential caste problem, if there is one, would
be to reinstate some version of the Rule, or, for those states that have not
yet abolished the Rule, to keep it in place. Of course, many states are
unlikely to follow this path given their goal of attracting as much trust
business as possible. For the same reason, however, the Dukeminier and
Krier proposals are unlikely to be adopted, unless the proposed statutes
are drafted in such a way that the settlor can specify that they do not ap-
ply. While default rules are not the best answer to the caste objection,
they may be the only solution that states would actually consider. Alter-
natively, Congress could amend the GST tax exemption so as not to ap-
164. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1323-24.
165. On the growth possibilities of dynasty trusts, see id. at 1318-19. One must also remember,
however, that the number of beneficiaries will also increase exponentially. Each beneficiary's slice
of the pie will be far smaller in 100 years, even if the pie is much larger.
166. This is a long-standing argument, dating back at least to the thirteenth century. See 2
HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 181 (George E. Wood-
bine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (c. 1230) ("[A] citizen could
scarcely be found who would undertake a great enterprise in his lifetime if, at his death, he was com-
pelled against his will to leave his estate to ignorant and extravagant children and undeserving
wives."); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND.
L.J. 1, 7-8, 8 n.25, 16, 16 n.60 (1992) (citing Bentham, Blackstone, John Stuart Mill, and others).
The argument has its detractors. See id. at 8-9 (offering a variety of psychological and other reasons
that motivate a person to accumulate wealth).
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ply to perpetual trusts, 16 7 which would reduce (but not eliminate) the in-
centive for creating perpetual dynasty trusts. Amending the federal tax
code would probably be simpler than rewriting the law of trusts in every
state that has abolished the Rule.
Unlike the current variations on the Rule, the proposals of Duke-
minier and Krier do not simply limit the duration of a trust: they also af-
fect how trust income is distributed among the beneficiaries. Allowing
beneficiaries to keep a perpetual trust in existence while modifying its
terms would not necessarily prevent the creation of a leisure class, but
would give the members of that class the power to reduce or eliminate
incentives for productive behavior. It is possible to hold the view that
perpetuities should be curbed because of their likely negative impact on
society while also taking the position that, so long as a trust remains in
existence, the settlor's wishes should govern the manner in which in-
come is distributed. Even a supporter of the Rule, therefore, might prefer
no statute at all to a statute that allows the beneficiaries to modify a trust
without terminating it.
There may be situations in which modification or termination of a
trust is necessary regardless of the settlor's wishes. After many decades,
multiplication of beneficiaries could make a perpetual trust so cumber-
some that the expense of administering the trust far outweighs the benefit
that the beneficiaries receive. When a settlor has failed to anticipate a
change in circumstances, modification or termination can be justified.
As discussed above, both the Uniform Trust Code and the Third Re-
statement offer mechanisms by which a court can intervene to modify or
terminate a trust under certain circumstances, 168 and it is not the aim of
this Article to discuss the wisdom of those reforms. Under either the
Code or the Restatement, the settlor's intent must always be taken into
consideration. Dukeminier and Krier would make the settlor's intent ir-
relevant: they would allow courts to modify or terminate a trust without
considering the settlor's intent and would give broad powers to benefici-
aries and trustees to modify or terminate without court approval. These
proposals go far beyond what the drafters of the Code and the Restate-
ment have proposed, and state legislatures need to consider carefully
whether the wishes of the settlor should be pushed aside in the manner
suggested by Dukeminier and Krier. 
169
167. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1342-43 (discussing the effect of limiting the
GST tax exemption).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 70-82.
169. Another difficulty with the proposals of Dukeminier and Krier is that, by eliminating court




Dukeminier and Krier suggest that their statutory proposals are a re-
sponse to problems likely to arise from the creation of perpetual dynasty
trusts. In fact, however, the proposals of Dukeminier and Krier go far
beyond that, and would have an impact on all trusts, not just perpetuities.
While some of the proposals made by Dukeminier and Krier would apply
only when the beneficiaries known to the settlor have died, two are not
limited in this way: the proposal that the trustee have a statutory power to
terminate the trust and the proposal that the beneficiaries have the power
to replace the trustee at will. 170 Taken together, these two rules would
allow the beneficiaries to shop for a trustee who is willing to terminate
the trust, rendering moot any conditions on access to trust funds specified
by the settlor.
It is appropriate for legal scholars to suggest ways in which the law
can be improved. It is also important, however, for state legislatures to
understand the nature of the proposals that academics are suggesting.
When a proposal would move the law into uncharted waters, states
should be made aware of that fact. American courts may not always im-
plement the settlor's intent, but ignoring the settlor's wishes is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Dukeminier and Krier would effectively trans-
fer the settlor's freedom to the beneficiaries. That would be a bold
change indeed, and one that state legislatures are probably unwilling to
make. In any event, whether it is proper to respect the settlor's intent is a
policy question with far-reaching implications. It would be unwise to
answer the question in haste simply because several states now allow for
the creation of perpetuities, and it is far from clear that substituting the
beneficiaries' wishes for the settlor's intent would be the best solution.
The abolition of the Rule should not be used as a pretext for conducting a
wholesale revision of the American law of trusts.
necessary to ensure that each beneficiary has meaningfully consented to modification or termination.
170. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1341-42.
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